### RESPONSE TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE ON IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ON GOOD GOVERNANCE (5 May, 2025)

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#### I. All Stakeholders (core questions)

• What are the opportunities and the challenges or risks of integrating AI into governance frameworks, particularly in terms of promoting and protecting human rights and upholding good governance principles?

As the OECD has noted<sup>1</sup>, the deployment of AI can contribute to improving public services particularly by enhancing predictive capabilities—and can offer potential benefits for human rights by improving institutional transparency and monitoring. On the other hand, the potential risks of deploying AI in public services may also lead to human rights concerns. These include threats to democracy and social cohesion through the spread of disinformation, lack of safety and trustworthiness, unexpected harms, concentration of power in a small number of companies and countries, invasive surveillance and privacy infringement, institutional mechanisms unable to keep up with rapid AI evolutions, weakened accountability due to lack of explainability and interpretability, and the exacerbation of inequality or poverty within or between countries. Despite these risks, public service AI is often being deployed rapidly without sufficient mitigation or prevention measures, underscoring the urgent need for policy principles and regulatory interventions.

The UN Secretary-General has also pointed out the potential of new technologies, including AI, to support states in maximizing the use of available resources for the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. Such technologies can promote the right to participation, the right to access information and access to information and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public

<sup>1</sup> OECD (2024). Assessing Potential Future Artificial Intelligence Risks, Benefits and Policy Imperatives. OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, No. 27. < https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/assessing-potential-future-artificial-intelligence-risks-benefits-and-policy-imperatives\_3f4e3dfb-en.html>.

decision-making (A/HRC/43/29). However, they may lead to significant unintended risks to human rights, as algorithms often reflect and reproduce existing biases and can be misused to spread hatred, as seen on social media. Moreover the collection and processing of a large amount of personal data without due consideration for the right to privacy has significant implications for the enjoyment of rights more generally.

In this context, States should create opportunities for rights holders,

particularly those most affected or likely to suffer adverse consequences, to effectively participate and contribute to the development process, and facilitate targeted adoption of new technologies. Through participation and inclusive consultation, States can determine what technologies would be most appropriate and effective as they pursue balanced and integrated sustainable development with economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, inclusion and equity.

As Kate Crawford (2021) has pointed out<sup>2</sup>, there is growing concern that AI companies at the global level tend to rely on exploitative practices involving the large-scale extraction and misuse of environmental, labor, and personal data. The resulting inequalities between and within countries may be amplified when these companies supply public services. Therefore, the UN Human Rights Council should establish and recommend clear principles of a human rights-based approach in AI governance.

### • Which human rights are most likely to be affected, and how can these potential impacts be managed or mitigated?

AI systems deployed in public services have the most significant impact on the right to due process, the right to privacy, and the right to non-discrimination. However, surveillance in public spaces can also suppress general freedoms such as freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought. Similarly, AI used in educational institutions can affect the right to education, while AI used in social welfare services can impact the right to social security. In this way, public service AI can, in effect, influence the exercise of nearly all human rights.

One way to manage adverse human rights impacts ex post facto is to ensure the explainability, interpretability, and contestability of AI driven decision-making. However, these safeguards may be difficult to fully realize due to the inherent characteristics of advanced AI techniques, such as deep learning. Therefore, the most effective approach is to proactively and periodically identify, prevent, or mitigate risks. A key method for doing so is through ex-ante and periodic human rights impact

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Kate Crawford (2021). Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. Yale University Press.

assessments. A human rights impact assessment is a feedback-oriented process that not only identifies and evaluates risks to human rights but also includes measures for their prevention and mitigation.

• To what extend would social groups (e.g., marginalized communities, children, persons with disabilities, older persons) be vulnerable or at risk to the negative impacts from AI in governance? And in what ways should these risks be mitigated?

As noted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights regarding digital welfare (A/74/48037), significant problems have arisen as AI-based public services make determinations about individual rights based on the basis of predictions derived from the behavior of a general population groups. The functioning of these technologies and how they arrive at a certain scores or classifications is often secret, thus making it difficult to hold governments and private actors to account for potential rights violations. In such a context, risk-scoring and need categorization in public services can reinforce or exacerbate existing inequalities and discrimination. This is especially problematic when the private sector is taking a leading role in designing, constructing, and even operating significant parts of the digital welfare state.

As Cathy O'Neil (2016) has pointed out<sup>3</sup>, mathematical models are inherently based on the past and rely on the assumption that patterns will continue. This makes historically and socially marginalized or vulnerable communities particularly susceptible to the negative impacts of AI. AI algorithms often generate new forms of direct or indirect discrimination based on proxy variables such as school performance record<sup>4</sup> or postal codes<sup>5</sup>. In countries like South Korea, where there is no comprehensive anti-discrimination legal framework, even identifying what constitutes discrimination can be difficult. Therefore, addressing algorithmic bias against social groups cannot be left solely to tech companies or technical experts. It is necessary to establish domestic and international principles and norms on how to identify and prevent discrimination by AI systems. States must identify and improve procedures, practices, and legislation regarding anti-discrimination to address effectively algorithm-driven discrimination. In particular, governance frameworks must ensure the participation of individuals who are at high risk of discriminatory impact, or organizations that can represent them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Cathy O'Neil (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. Crown Books.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Alex Hern (2020). Ofqual's A-level algorithm: why did it fail to make the grade?. The Guardian. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/aug/21/ofqual-exams-algorithm-why-did-it-fail-make-grade-a-levels">https://www.theguardian.com/education/2020/aug/21/ofqual-exams-algorithm-why-did-it-fail-make-grade-a-levels</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick, and Genie Barton (2019). Algorithmic bias detection and mitigation: Best practices and policies to reduce consumer harms. Brookings. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/">https://www.brookings.edu/articles/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/</a>>.

• What strategies or initiatives (local, national, or international) are most effective in bridging digital divides, so that AI-driven governance benefits marginalized or underserved communities?

In an era of society-wide digital transformation, addressing the digital divide requires tackling both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of accessibility. First, governments must support underserved regions from the perspective of the right to social security. For vulnerable populations such as the elderly and persons with disabilities, limited access to digital knowledge and skills poses serious risks, including exposure to manipulation or fraud that exploit their digital vulnerability.

At the same time, new forms of digital exploitation or violations are emerging, particularly among vulnerable populations including children. The rise of digital gender based violence against women and girls through new technologies such as deepfakes, threatens to suppress or deter their free participation in digital spaces. Therefore, qualitative aspects of digital accessibility must also be considered.

As with internet access, expanding digital infrastructure quantitatively alone cannot resolve accessibility issues in the age of digital transformation. It is equally important to ensure the safety of digital environments and to empower citizens to exercise their rights within those environments. As highlighted in World Programme for Human Rights Education(A/HRC/57/34), digital literacy must go beyond improving internet access—it must also enhance individuals' knowledge, skills, and attitudes to enable them to assert their rights and respect those of others. In addition to expanding public and commercial infrastructure and improving access to it, there is a pressing need for strategies and initiatives—local, national, and international—that aim to improve the digital environment itself and ensure that digital platforms or companies are held accountable for respecting human rights.

• In what ways does AI strengthening or potentially undermining good governance, especially regarding transparency, accountability, and public participation? Alternatively, what aspects of good governance could AI improve?

AI holds significant potential to enhance good governance, particularly in the area of transparency and public participation, due to its capacity to efficiently sort, filter, and summarise vast amounts of information. This capability can facilitate broader disclosure of public service data and support civil society organizations in monitoring and evaluating government services, thereby strengthening public engagement(OECD, 2024).

However, as noted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights(A/HRC/48/31), challenges related to transparency remain unresolved due to the inherent "black box" nature of deep learning systems and the secrecy often maintained by advanced technology companies. Without transparency, it becomes difficult to ensure explainability, interpretability, and the ability to contest AI-driven decisions—all of which are necessary for meaningful accountability. Transparency is therefore a prerequisite not only for institutional responsibility, but also for ensuring the substance and legitimacy of public participation.

# • Which mechanisms ensure that AI-driven decision-making processes remain transparent and accountable (e.g., explainable algorithms, external audits, ethics committees), and what other ideas or practices would you suggest?

For AI-based decision-making systems with potential significant impacts on human rights, there must be institutional obligations for documentation, record-keeping, and explanation. These records are essential for ensuring the explainability, interpretability, and contestability of decisions that affect individuals, and for enabling meaningful human oversight. Furthermore, mechanisms must be established to guarantee access to these documents for individuals seeking judicial or administrative redress when harm has occurred due to AI-driven decisions.

In parallel, AI systems should be subject to proactively and ongoing evaluations to identify, prevent, or mitigate risks. Among the most robust mechanisms grounded in human rights is the human rights impact assessment (HRIA), which should be mandatory—especially for AI used in public services. Importantly, these assessments must be conducted by entities independent of the decision-makers themselves. Equally critical is the guarantee of participatory governance in these assessments: individuals affected by the decision-making, or organizations representing them, should be involved in the evaluation process. This applies not only at the level of national policymaking but also within workplaces, schools, and local communities, where those impacted by AI systems must have opportunities to express their concerns and perspectives from the stages of design and deployment onward.

### • Which mechanisms promote public transparency in AI-driven decisions (e.g., mandatory explanation of algorithmic outcomes, appeal processes)?

For AI-driven decision-making systems with potential significant impacts on human rights, obligations for documentation, record-keeping, and explanation must be imposed. In the event of

human rights violations, these mechanisms must enable public authorities to investigate and take corrective actions based on records and documented reasoning.

In addition, whenever AI is used in domains where it may significantly affect human rights including in the public sector—there should be a requirement for proactive and periodic human rights impact assessments (HRIAs), with key findings made publicly available. Affected individuals must be guaranteed the ability to access essential information about the AI systems that influence them. In cases of rights violations, oversight bodies must be institutionally guaranteed legally access to detailed and comprehensive information, even when business confidentiality is at stake, so they can conduct thorough investigations and ensure effective remedies.

• What are the primary obstacles to achieving transparency and accountability (proprietary algorithms, inadequate regulation, limited resources, etc.), and how can these challenges be overcome?

Due to the inherent "black box" nature of deep learning and the secrecy maintained by advanced technology companies, the challenge of AI transparency remains difficult to resolve. This lack of transparency limits the explainability, interpretability, and contestability of AI-based decisions for affected individuals, while also hindering public investigations and access to remedies in cases of harm.

To address these issues, public support—both at the national and international levels—is needed to enable independent research free from commercial interests. At the same time, there must be improvements in the procedures, practices, and legislation necessary to establish and implement normative standards for transparency and accountability in AI systems.

• Who should regulate AI to ensure it is aligned with good governance and respect for human rights principles? Is there a need for centralized or independent oversight bodies, and if so, what should their mandate and authority include?

To ensure that AI is regulated in alignment with good governance and the principles of human rights, oversight should be carried out by an independent regulatory body. This body must be protected not only from the influence of government institutions but also from the interests of private sector actors. Furthermore, it should be provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively fulfill its supervisory functions.

Rather than delegating authority solely to a technical ministry, oversight could be exercised through a inter-agency governance mechanism, where sector-specific regulatory bodies coordinate. In Korea, for example, there are already various regulators responsible for areas such as industrial safety, product and toy safety, elevator safety, traffic safety, maritime safety, medical device regulation, general consumer protection, financial consumer protection, telecommunications oversight, personal data protection, and remedies for human rights violations and discrimination. A national AI oversight framework should be closely linked with the expertise and mandates of these sectoral regulators. In the event of harm, oversight bodies must be institutionally guaranteed access to comprehensive information—even when corporate confidentiality is at stake—in order to conduct in-depth investigations and ensure redress. These bodies must also offer effective complaint and remedy mechanisms for those affected.

However, in Korea, the Framework Act on the Promotion and Advancement of Artificial Intelligence(hereinafter "AI Act Korea"), enacted on January 21, 2025, designates the Ministry of Science and ICT, a ministry responsible for promoting high-tech industries, as the competent authority. This ministry is even also tasked with "assessing the impact of AI on fundamental rights" (Article 35), while it only conducts investigations "when necessary" and does not guarantee sufficient redress for affected individuals(Article 40). It is therefore imperative that independent regulators, including national human rights institutions, be involved from the stage of setting standards to the execution of human rights impact assessments and remedies.

#### • Should AI be used in decision-making processes for government services?

AI can be used in decision-making processes for government services. In Korea, the General Act on Public Administration already allows fully automated decision-making based on AI for nondiscretionary administrative measures, as prescribed by law (Article 20), and such decisions have already been applied in certain areas such as traffic enforcement. However, this law—and related statutes—contain no provisions to ensure transparency, accountability, or human oversight in such automated decisions.

The Personal Information Protection Act does provide for data subjects' rights to object to, or request an explanation of, fully automated decisions (Article 37-2), but this provision explicitly excludes automated decisions made under the General Act on Public Administration.

Meanwhile, the AI Act Korea obligates high-impact AI providers to develop explanation mechanisms, but only "within the scope technically possible." While the Act also assigns responsibility for human oversight and documentation of high-impact AI (Article 34), it provides few enforcement or penalty provisions in case of violations.

There are currently no binding public procurement standards in Korea to ensure transparency, accountability, or human rights compliance in public AI services. The AI Act Korea only stipulates that government agencies should prioritize the use of AI systems for which an impact assessment has been conducted (Article 35).

Overall, in Korea, AI-based government decision-making relies merely on constitutional and abstract principles of due process, without guaranteeing specific procedural rights. Despite the fact that AIbased decisions are already being implemented, individuals affected by them are not guaranteed the right to object, request explanations, or contest such decisions. Nor are the AI providers or deployers for public services generally obligated to ensure explainability, human oversight, or documentation. Therefore, both domestic and international standards for mandatory public procurement of AI in government services must be established. These standards should explicitly incorporate the principles of due process—such as explainability, interpretability, and contestability—to guarantee transparency and accountability. Individuals must be granted the right to object AI-driven decisions and human oversight must be ensured. In particular, when government services are provided to vulnerable populations—such as in the area of social welfare—exclusive reliance on AI or digital-only services must be restricted, and sufficient human support must be guaranteed. Moreover, proactive and periodic human rights impact assessments should be conducted for AI-based government decisionmaking. These assessments must involve national human rights institutions in both standard-setting and implementation, and ensure that affected individuals or their representative organizations can participate in the assessment process.

#### **II.** Questions for Specific Stakeholders

#### 4. Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights Advocates

## • How do you monitor AI's impact on human rights, especially among vulnerable or marginalized groups, and which tools or methodologies are most effective?

Our organization, in collaboration with other civil society colleagues, has been actively identifying the negative impacts of artificial intelligence on the rights of vulnerable and marginalized communities, and advocating for policy interventions to address these issues.

(1) During the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of opaque AI-based recruitment systems became widespread. However, applicants in structurally vulnerable positions found it difficult to raise concerns about such practices. In 2020, our organization and other civil society groups used the Freedom of Information mechanism to find out how public institutions—where accountability is especially crucial—were implementing AI recruitment tools<sup>6</sup>. Most public bodies, however, refused disclosure by citing trade secrets of the private companies that had supplied the AI systems, or even responded that no such information existed. In the subsequent, lawsuit the court found that public institutions do have a duty to disclose key aspects of AI recruitment<sup>7</sup>. Nevertheless, since the requests were submitted by third parties, we faced limitations in uncovering unjust or biased decision-making in specific cases or in seeking redress for affected individuals.

(2) In 2021, a startup's AI chatbot named 'Iruda' sparked public controversy for generating hate speech targeting women, people with disabilities, LGBTQ+, and people of color<sup>8</sup>. It was later revealed that the chatbot had been trained on private messenger conversations of around 600,000 users, including approximately 200,000 minors under the age of 14, without their consent. In response, our organization, together with other civil society groups, filed a complaint with the Personal Information Protection Commission(the Data Protection Authority of Korea, hereinafter 'PIPC') and a petition with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, prompting public authorities to act<sup>9</sup>. PIPC imposed a fine of approximately 100 million KRW<sup>10</sup>. However, the human rights commission dismissed the case, stating that "chatbots are not legal persons and therefore cannot be investigated for hate speech." <sup>11</sup> Following this decision, our organization actively engaged with the human rights commission and contributed to the adoption of the Guidelines on Human Rights in AI Development and Use<sup>12</sup> as well as the development of a Human Rights Impact Assessment Tool for AI<sup>13</sup>.
(3) In 2021, during a review of public procurement information, our organization discovered that the Ministry of Science and ICT had provided multiple private facial

recognition companies with extensive personal data—including facial images of both Korean

< https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/tech-science/20210113/controversial-chatbot-leaves-lessons-on-ai-use-ethics>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> https://idr.jinbo.net/619 (Only Koran)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> https://idr.jinbo.net/1430 (Only Koran)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Hyo-jin Lee (2021). Controversial chatbot leaves lessons on AI use ethics. The Korea Times.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> https://idr.jinbo.net/702 (Only Koran)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Jasmine Park (2021). South Korea: The First Case Where the Personal Information Protection Act was Applied to an AI System. Future of Privacy Forum. <a href="https://fpf.org/blog/south-korea-the-first-case-where-the-personal-information-protection-act-was-applied-to-an-ai-system/">https://fpf.org/blog/south-korea-the-first-case-where-the-personal-information-protection-act-was-applied-to-an-ai-system/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> https://idr.jinbo.net/76591 (Only Koran)

https://www.humanrights.go.kr/site/program/board/basicboard/view?boardtypeid=24&boardid=7607961&menu id=001004002001 (Only Koran)

https://www.humanrights.go.kr/base/board/read?boardManagementNo=24&boardNo=7610404&menuLevel=3 &menuNo=91 (Only Koran)

nationals and foreign nationals. The total volume of data amounted to approximately 1.7 billion records, collected through immigration control systems since 2005 for Korean nationals and since 2010 for foreign nationals<sup>14</sup>. We reported this finding to the National Assembly's audit process and the media, and jointly filed complaints with the PIPC, the Board of Audit and Inspection, and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, together with fellow civil society organizations. The PIPC and the Board of Audit and Inspection both concluded that the data-sharing practice did not constitute a legal violation. However, the National Human Rights Commission issued a recommendation to government ministries to impose a moratorium on the introduction and use of real-time remote facial recognition technologies<sup>15</sup>. Our organization and partner groups supported access requests submitted by Korean and foreign individuals seeking to verify whether their data had been affected, but the Ministry of Justice refused to process these access requests, and the PIPC's mediation process also rejected them. As a final measure, we filed a constitutional complaint and are currently awaiting a decision<sup>16</sup>.

(4) In 2025, our organization, together with the partner group, conducted and published a study on the status and risks of AI systems used in Korea's public institutions, law enforcement, education, and social welfare sectors<sup>17</sup>. The study was based on an analysis of publicly available media reports and official publications.

All of the above monitoring efforts were based on publicly accessible methodologies, including freedom of information requests, analysis of procurement information, and open-source media coverage. However, monitoring conducted from an external, third-party perspective could only access partial truths, and it proved difficult to uncover the full factual context. In the case of the immigration control AI system, in particular, we attempted to access data regarding affected individuals, but the government had already deleted the relevant systems and data, and refused to disclose any information related to the harm, thus blocking any avenue for remedy.

In cases such as the immigration AI system, where public AI systems may have significant human rights implications, documentation and access rights must be mandated by law. When rights violations occur, an oversight body must be empowered to conduct investigations and provide active redress for victims, and such a body must be independent from the interests of government agencies, AI developers, and service providers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Cheon Ho-sung (2021). S. Korean government provided 170M facial images obtained in immigration process to private AI developers. Hankyoreh. <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_national/1016107.html">https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_national/1016107.html</a>>.

https://www.humanrights.go.kr/base/board/read?boardManagementNo=24&boardNo=7609889&searchCategor y=&page=1&searchType=&searchWord=&menuLevel=3&menuNo=9191 (Only Koran)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> https://idr.jinbo.net/1167 (Only Koran)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet, Institute for Digital Rights (2025). Research on AI policy and Issues in Key Areas in South Korea : Public Sector, Law Enforcement, Education and Social Welfare.
<a href="https://idr.jinbo.net/2301">https://idr.jinbo.net/2301</a>>.

### • What do you perceive as the challenges or obstacles surrounding discussions on AI governance, and how can multi-stakeholder partnerships contribute to addressing them?

In Korea, the National AI Committee has been established under the President's office. It consists of 12 government representatives and 30 civilian members. However, the civilian members are predominantly drawn from the scientific community, advanced technology industries, and the legal sector, with no participation from affected individuals or organizations that represent them<sup>18</sup>. Currently, public perception of AI governance in Korea tends to regard it as a domain reserved for elite actors—namely, government officials, corporations, academia, and legal experts. However, a human rights-based approach, including frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, has consistently emphasized the importance of participation by affected individuals and communities. This principle should likewise apply to AI governance.

AI governance must not be limited to those who develop or deploy AI technologies. It must also institutionally guarantee the participation of those who are impacted by these systems—such as workers, recipients of social welfare, consumers, patients, and students. This inclusive governance structure should be ensured not only at the national level, but also across workplaces, public services, schools, and local communities. Through such inclusive, multi-stakeholder governance, affected individuals and groups must be provided with access to information about the development and use of AI systems, and mechanisms must be in place to ensure their voices are reflected in decision-making processes.

### • Which public campaigns or educational initiatives have proven successful in raising awareness about AI's risks and benefits in governance?

In Korea, national authorities have actively promoted public campaigns and educational initiatives on AI, including the President's directive encouraging civil servants to use ChatGPT<sup>19</sup> and the government's push to introduce AI Digital Textbooks (hereinafter 'AIDT') in schools. However, these efforts have primarily focused on promoting the benefits of AI, while failing to engage meaningfully with affected stakeholders or communicate adequate safeguards to prevent associated risks. This top-down, authoritative approach has drawn criticism for its lack of transparency and inclusiveness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> https://aikorea.go.kr/web/content.do?menu\_cd=000008(Only Korean, accessed 4 May, 2025).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> https://biz.chosun.com/it-science/ict/2023/06/27/4EJRRFJ24BEVXB64PBPWGC2SAU/ (Only Koran)

In particular, the rollout of AIDT has proceeded rapidly and without sufficient dialogue with key educational stakeholders such as students, parents, and teachers. As a result, it has generated significant social conflict. Political biases at the local level have led to disparities in the adoption of AI textbooks across schools<sup>20</sup>.

During the legislative process of AI Act Korea, there was also a lack of meaningful engagement with civil society groups that had advocated for a robust, risk-based regulatory approach. Instead, government bodies and the National Assembly prioritized the concerns of domestic companies fearing loss of competitiveness in the global market. The Act contains no clear provisions on prohibited uses of AI, and includes very few penalties for violations.

### • What resources or partnerships would most help you enhance your role in monitoring and influencing AI governance?

Freedom of information requests, investigative journalism, and access to public procurement information have all been essential resources in our AI monitoring work. These forms of public information disclosure must be further expanded. In particular, for AI systems with potentially significant impacts on human rights, key facts—including human rights risks and any mitigation or prevention measures—should be made publicly accessible through mandatory registration and disclosure mechanisms.

At the same time, public funding and support—both nationally and internationally—are needed to enable independent research on these issues that is free from commercial interests. Moreover, this monitoring and research must be actively connected to national human rights institutions and AI oversight governance structures, so that findings can contribute to improving relevant procedures, practices, and legislation, and support remedies for affected individuals.

### • What policy or mechanism does the organization have to assist individuals harmed by AI systems in accessing remedies or due process?

Our organization has monitored the impact on human rights of AI systems and supported individuals through complaints or constitutional petitions. However, as a third-party actor from civil society, we face serious limitations in accessing adequate information. In many cases, key information about AI systems—including documentation and records of potential harms—is not preserved or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> https://www.educhang.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5896/ (Only Koran)

institutionalized, and even when it exists, affected individuals are not guaranteed access to it. As a result, pursuing remedies through judicial or non-judicial mechanisms becomes virtually impossible. There is a need for the UN Human Rights Council to adopt a global declaration on principles of remedy for AI-related human rights violations, calling for national and institutional systems to independently monitor and provide redress. Such principles of remedy would serve as safeguards to help reform the procedures and practices of public agencies and corporations that develop and deploy AI systems.

Although the Council of Europe has released its Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, the South Korean government has not expressed any intention to sign it. This lack of policy action undermines public trust in the governance of public-sector AI and poses a serious threat to democratic accountability.

At the global level, AI industry power is increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries and companies, intensifying market competition. This has even led to a race to the bottom, where existing privacy and environmental protections are being weakened. In this context, the role of UN-based human rights norms in upholding the value of rights-based approaches and establishing guardrails for the protection of human rights is more critical than ever.

#### **Additional Questions**

• *Environmental Sustainability*: how should AI governance incorporate environmental concerns (e.g., energy consumption, e-waste) to ensure sustainable development?

First, information on the environmental and climate impacts of the AI industry must be disclosed. In addition, AI-related carbon emissions should be regulated within the environmental regulatory frameworks. In particular, providers of advanced AI models with exceptionally high energy consumption should be subject to legally binding environmental obligations.

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